

Reflections on Unwanted Traffic After the IAB Workshop

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Why an "Unwanted Traffic" workshop

Lots of Unwanted Traffic on the Internet today

- (D)DoS, Spam, viruses, worms, etc.

The trend

- The ratio of Unwanted Traffic is increasing, not decreasing
- Persistence of infected hosts considerable

The impact

Significant and growing economic losses





Evolution of Threats - I

We had:

 Worms and viruses that simply did wreak havoc on the network

Now we see:

- malware that propagates, compromises hosts and enables command and control infrastructure and services platforms for malicious activity
 - Code Red (DDoS against IP)
 - Blaster (DDoS against hostname)
 - Deloder (Arbitrary DDoS toolkit)





Evolution of Threats - II

Initial major threat from botnets

(D)DoS attacks

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Today it forms an array of employment functions for

(mostly) threats with economic motivations

(to a lesser degree) threats have religious,
 political, etc, motivation as well

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The Workshop

IAB called the workshop to

- Assess the state of affairs
- Examine existing counter measures
- Collect input for action planning

Participants

The major findings are report in:

draft-iab-iwout-report-03.txt





The Workshop Findings

An Underground Economy exists

It drives majority of unwanted traffic

An arms race with the evolving underground economy

- Currently the situation is getting worse
- Increasing virulence of malware
- Persistence of existing compromised systems

An action plan is needed!







The Root of All Evils: An Underground Economy

- The Underground Ecor my is a virtual shopping mall where selongings and assets are boy
- The shopping m
 managed by c
- They use the have developed to run the see
- Invento dit cards, bank accor internet routers, busin cal servers, bots, botnets.



Why an Underground Economy?

The monetary incentives are HUGE! Lack of meaningful deterrence

- Vulnerable host platforms
- Lack of education to add protection or prompt repair
- Prosecution of miscreants extremely difficult

"No" proactive actions from service providers

- Lack of resources
- Lack of adequate tools
- Efforts go into reactive patches (damage control, miscreants move around)
- Rare for mitigation to involve sanitizing hosts
- ROI



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The botnet example

Vectors

- Vulnerability -> Exploit
- Compromise / Infection
- Propagation
- C&C



Employment

- DDoS (spoof and non)
- Spam
- Spam w/phishing,
 host phishing sites
- Open proxies
- ID theft
- Key loggers
- Lift CD keys
- Click Fraud
- Stream video?
- Marketing!



Current Vulnerabilities and Existing Solutions

Vulnerabilities

Source address spoofing

BGP route hijacking

"Everything over HTTP"

Everyone comes from

Everywhere

Complex network

authentication

Security tools - unused

Solutions

<u>Internet</u>

Access control lists (ACL)

BGP null routing

BCP38

uRPF/BCP 84

Enterprise

Firewalls

ALGs

Anti-Spam SW



Why Existing Solutions Fail

Tools are inadequate ...

...or improperly deployed

Competence is low ...

... and education is inadequate

Network operators must demonstrate ROI for CAPEX and BCP investment, not immediately obvious





Hard Questions

Internet Architecture and stopping Unwanted Traffic

- Cryptographic mechanisms
- Curtailing the openness
- Increasing the system complexity
- Architectural principles we need to preserve
- Separate control plane
- The adversary is very adaptive ...
 - ... and will take counter actions for any move we make to defend ourselves e.g. BlueSecurity example



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Bad - going on worse

But we see things that can be done!

There is a light in the end of the tunnel!

Situation will stay "gloomy" only as long

as we don't act!

The hydra!



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Medium and Long Term

Tightening security of the routing infrastructure Cleaning up the Internet Routing Registry Repository [IRR], and securing both the database and the access, so that it can be used for routing verifications

Take down bots and botnets

Even without a magic wand we are able to take measures to reduce the unwanted traffic

Community education (e.g., TCP MD5, use the filtering BCP's, etc..)

Layer security, raise the bar



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Actionable

Update the host requirements
Update the router requirements.
Update ingress filtering (BCP38 [RFC2827] and BCP 84 [RFC3704]).

The IAB

inform the community about the existence of the underground economy.

The IRTF

- steps toward understanding the Underground Economy
- encourage research on effective countermeasures.





A Concluding Note

The Underground Economy is different from what we have seen before

- It's no longer kids with nothing better to do
- It is a financially motivated illegal activity
- The technology and global connectedness of the Internet is just the enabler

The situation is getting worse
However, there is growing awareness of
the issues of the Underground
Economy and that is the first step
towards effective solutions





End of presentation

Questions?

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